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This paper investigates the relationship between investor protection and CEO pay in family-
controlled corporations. Using a panel of 986 firm-year observations from 11 EU countries, we 
show that the lower the investor protection, the higher the compensation of the CEO. The 
sensitivity of pay to the institutional context is higher for a family CEO than a professional CEO, 
a result that corroborates the hypothesis that CEO compensation contracts in family firms are 
influenced by familiar connections. Overall, these results are more consistent with the 
hypothesis of rent extraction than with the perspective of optimal remuneration contracts. 
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Family firms are the most widespread form of 
business organizations (La Porta et al., 1999), 
running a significant part of the economy in non-
Anglo-Saxon countries such as Continental Europe 
(Faccio and Lang, 2002, Barca and Becht, 2001) and 
Asia (Claessens et al., 2000), but also in the U.S. 
(Neubauer and Lank, 1998, Anderson and Reeb, 
2003, Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). From an 
international perspective, the behavior of family 
firms may be exposed to the influence of the 
institutional context. In fact, the ultimate aim that 
inspires family firm decisions is the result of 
contrasting forces and values (Corbetta and Salvato, 
2004), where the stewardship orientation of family 
members (Davis et al., 1997), the emotional value 
attached to the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), and 
the desire to preserve the firm as an asset to pass on 
to the heirs (Casson, 1999, James, 1999a) are 
opposed to the opportunity for the family to extract 
private benefits through the expropriation of 
minority shareholders (Morck and Yeung, 2003). The 
level of investor protection of a country might affect 
this equilibrium, insofar as it could mitigate 
expropriation of minority investors’ wealth by the 
controlling family (Pindado et al., 2014), so that the 
ultimate aims of the family may be contingent upon 
the institutional environment.  
Financial studies offer empirical evidence 
showing that family ownership might be associated 
with a premium or a discount on firm value and 
performance, depending on the level of investor 
protection of the country where the firm operates 
(Maury, 2006). However, although recent studies 
urge to consider the effects of the context in which 
firms are embedded on executive incentives and 
firm governance (Aguilera et al., 2008, Filatotchev 
and Allcock, 2010), little evidence exists on the 
relationship between the institutional context and 
family firm compensation practices.  
In this paper we contribute to fill this gap by 
performing a cross-country analysis of the 
relationship between the level of investor protection 
and CEO pay policies, with a special focus on family 
firms. We also pay attention to heterogeneity - an 
inspirational theme that has a prominent role within 
family business research (Salvato and Aldrich, 2012, 
Voordeckers et al., 2014, Sharma, 2002) – through 
the analysis of the different exposure of family CEOs 
and professional CEOs pay packages to the 
institutional context.  
Results show that the lower the level of 
investor protection, the higher the total, cash-based, 
and equity-based CEO compensation. This 
relationship is confirmed also for family-owned 
firms, although the sensitivity to investor protection 
is higher for the family CEO than for the 
professional CEO. We argue that these results are 
more consistent with the hypothesis of rent 
extraction than with optimal remuneration 
contracts. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that analyzes the relationship between the 
institutional context and CEO pay in family firms. 
Although previous research has explored CEO 
compensation across different countries (see Boyd et 
al. (2012) for a comprehensive review on the topic), 
specific evidence for family firms has yet to be 
found. Through the lens of optimal contracting and 
opportunistic theories, our study allows for a more 
nuanced understanding of family firm CEO 
remuneration policies and also provides new 
empirical evidence on CEO pay of family-controlled 
corporations in Continental Europe. 
This research also contributes to the literature 
on CEO compensation practices by exploring CEO 
pay on a sample of countries characterized by the 
same cultural milieu (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) and 
by a significant variation in the level of investor 
protection. This approach allows the removal of 
differences in pay practices due to cultural norms 
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that might characterize different economic areas, i.e. 
Anglo-Saxon countries vs. Continental Europe 
(Fernandes et al., 2013), thus highlighting the effect 
of the level of investor protection.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and 
formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
sample and methodology. Section 4 presents the 
results of the empirical tests. Section 5 discusses the 
results and conclusions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.1. Investor protection and CEO pay 
 
Law and finance literature postulates that protection 
of shareholders and creditors by the institutional 
environment is essential to explaining cross-country 
patterns of economic development. Higher investor 
protection is associated with higher income per 
capita and higher numbers of listed securities (La 
Porta et al., 2013), more valuable stock markets and 
more developed financial intermediaries (La Porta et 
al., 1997, Levine et al., 2000), as well as more 
efficient resource allocation (Morck et al., 2000b). 
Moreover, shareholder protection has a number 
of implications for the ownership structure of a 
firm. First, weak investor protection is usually 
associated with concentrated equity ownership of 
corporations (La Porta et al., 2000). Second, marginal 
cost of equity financing is higher in countries with 
weak investor protection (Himmelberg et al., 2000). 
The level of investor protection and the degree 
of its enforcement can also affect firm performance 
and growth by decreasing information asymmetries, 
and by making it easier to raise external capital 
(Demirgüç Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). For 
instance, Dittmar et al. (2003) show that 
corporations heavily rely on cash in countries with 
weak investor protection; similarly, Giannetti (2003) 
shows that institutions that favor creditor rights and 
ensure stricter enforcement are characterized by 
higher leverage and higher availability of long-term 
debt. 
More recently, scholars have started to expand 
the analysis of the legal environment in which firms 
operate to the design of compensation contracts 
(Boyd et al., 2012). Under this view, an important 
source of heterogeneity among legal environments, 
namely the level of shareholder protection and the 
degree of their enforcement, can significantly affect 
corporate contracting decisions and the shape of 
CEO compensation contracts as well.  
With regard to the amount of total 
compensation granted to the CEO, some scholars 
argue that a positive relationship arises with the 
level of investor protection. Under an optimal 
contracting perspective, Albuquerque and Miao 
(2013) present a model in which, on the premise that 
better external governance is associated with better 
internal governance (Klapper and Love, 2004), the 
level of CEO pay is positively related to the level of 
investor protection, inasmuch as a better 
institutional context makes it more profitable for 
shareholders to grant higher formal pay to the CEO 
as a substitute for CEO’s extraction of private 
benefits. Contrarily, Brenner and Schwalbach (2009), 
under an opportunism perspective, assume that when 
setting compensation packages, directors are 
exposed to the CEO’s power (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003, Eriksson, 2005) as well as to a variety of other 
incentives to please the CEO (Shivdasani and 
Yermack, 1999). As a result, the less likely it is that 
directors can be held legally liable, due to lower 
investor protection, the more likely it becomes for 
the management to achieve ′′too generous′′ pay 
schemes. On a sample of firms from 27 countries, 
they find empirical confirmation to this hypothesis. 
The relative amount of incentive-based pay is 
another aspect of CEO compensation contracts that 
is exposed to the influence of the institutional 
context. Zheng et al. (2016) propose a model where, 
similarly to Albuquerque and Miao (2013), in order 
to compensate the CEO for shrinking in the 
consumption of managerial private benefits, 
additional pay should be granted under the form of 
incentive compensation, and a positive correlation 
between the level of investor protection and pay-
performance sensitivity in CEO pay arises. Bryan et 
al. (2010) and Bryan et al. (2011) assume that 
companies use more equity-based executive pay in 
countries with high level of investor protection and 
strict law enforcement, due to the fact that countries 
with strong legal environments have informationally 
efficient stock prices (Morck et al., 2000b), which in 
turn increase effectiveness of equity-based 
compensation. In a study of four Continental 
European and four Anglo-American countries, 
Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) find a positive 
association between the strength of investor 
protection and the relative use of incentive 
compensations. Similarly, Fahlenbrach (2008) 
analyzes a sample of large U.S. public companies 
and detects that firms operating in countries with 
weak investor protection have lower CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity, and extract excess total 
compensation from the company. The afore-
mentioned research suggests that the use of equity-
based compensation schemes is positively related to 
the strength of investor protection.  
On the contrary, Hüttenbrink et al. (2014) 
advocate a negative relationship between investor 
protection and stock-based incentives, on the 
premise that in countries with weak legal 
environments, pay-for-performance contracts are a 
substitute for the low level of investor protection. 
The analysis of the extant literature on the 
topic then reveals that both theoretical predictions 
and empirical evidence reach contradictory results. 
As suggested by Boyd et al. (2012) in a review of 
international executive compensation studies over 
the last two decades, more cross-country research 
on the impact of institutional environments on 
executive compensation practices is necessary. On 
this premise, we study the relationship between the 
level of investor protection and CEO pay on a sample 
of 11 Continental European countries over 1998-
2010, with a particular focus on family firms, the 
prevalent form of corporate ownership in 
Continental Europe. 
 
2.2. Agency relationship in family firms 
 
Within the classical agency-theory approach, CEO 
incentive compensation is conceived as a remedy to 
the conflict of interests between shareholders and 
managers, often referred to as Agency Problem I 
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(Villalonga and Amit, 2006). This agency problem 
arises from the separation of ownership and control 
that is typical of widely held firms, where the 
ownership of a small fraction of cash flows 
discourages each individual shareholder from 
monitoring management actions (the free riding 
problem), leaving managers free to pursue their own 
interests, eventually to the detriment of the firm’s 
value and shareholder interests (Berle and Means, 
1932). In an optimal contracting perspective, 
executive pay might help to reduce the agency costs 
arising from the relationship between the CEO and 
shareholders, through a compensation contract that 
links CEO pay to the market value of the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In family firms, the concentration of ownership 
in the hands of the family mitigates the Agency 
Problem I, due to either the lack of separation of 
ownership and control in firms managed by family 
members (Ang et al., 2000, Fama and Jensen, 1983, 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976), or the greater incentives 
for the family to monitor the CEO when the family 
firm is run by a “professional” CEO (Burkart et al., 
1997, Anderson and Reeb, 2003, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). Nonetheless, other agency costs may arise in 
family firms (Chrisman et al., 2004), such as altruism 
and self-control problems due to the combination of 
ownership and owner-management (Lubatkin et al., 
2005, Schulze et al., 2003), which appear in the form 
of perquisites and privileges granted to family 
members that they would not otherwise receive 
(Gersick et al., 1997, Ward, 1987). Moreover, when 
the family retains a number of shares that assures 
the control of the firm, and the residual ownership 
is dispersed amongst several small shareholders, the 
family has the opportunity to use its controlling 
position to extract private benefits at the expense of 
the small shareholders (Agency Problem II), 
especially when the family exercises control without 
owning a large fraction of the cash flow rights 
through the use of control-enhancing devices 
(Claessens et al., 2000, La Porta et al., 1999, Morck et 
al., 2005, Morck and Yeung, 2003)12. Examples of 
private benefit diversion include the payment of 
special dividends, excessive compensations scheme, 
and related-party transactions (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2000, Anderson and Reeb, 2004).  
However, alongside the agency costs, the family 
nature of ownership is also associated with several 
characteristics that potentially benefit the value of 
the firm. First, as noted above, families are in an 
extraordinary position to influence and monitor 
management. This effect is reinforced if monitoring 
requires knowledge of the firm's technology, 
provided that “families potentially provide superior 
oversight because their lengthy tenure permits them 
to move further along the firm's learning curve” 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Second, family owners 
largely relate their own reputation to the economic 
success of their firms (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004, 
Davis et al., 1997, Dyer and Whetten, 2006) and 
                                                          
12 The expropriation of wealth from other shareholders can take several 
forms, such as resources diverted from the firm to other firms where the 
ownership of the family is more concentrated, company properties 
confiscated by controlling families for their personal use, personal political 
careers for family members supported by company’s resources, as well as 
higher compensation for family members hired by the company (Morck et 
al, 2000a). 
conceive the firm as an asset to pass on to their 
heirs (Casson, 1999, James, 1999a), thus supporting 
the view of families as long-term investors 
committed to the success of the firm they invest in. 
Third, political connections centered on the family 
members’ relationships might be beneficial to the 
value of the firm, especially in countries with a high 
level of corruption (Faccio, 2006).  
Contrasting forces then compete within family 
firms, and the overall efficiency of family ownership 
depends on how these forces combine, i.e. whether 
the family pursues the maximization of its own 
wealth through maximization of the value of the 
firm or, conversely, the family indulges in parental 
altruism and expropriation of minority shareholders, 
so that “family ownership is no longer value-
maximizing but rather utility-maximizing for 
founding families” (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006, pg. 
74). 
 
2.3. CEO compensation in family firms 
 
The degree to which the family’s needs and 
desiderata might be effectively satisfied depends on 
the actions actually implemented by the CEO, who 
retains the formal power to make decisions within 
the firm. As a consequence, being one of the more 
powerful instruments in the hands of the family for 
addressing CEO actions, the compensation policy 
cannot be conceived independently from the 
ultimate aims of the family. 
In an ideal setting, where no contrasting 
objectives among the different groups of 
shareholders exist, both the family and minority 
shareholders agree to grant efficient CEO pay, and 
compensation is set at a level that does not exceed 
the minimum amount the CEO is willing to accept. In 
terms of incentives to be provided to the CEO of 
family firms, despite attenuated owner-manager 
conflicts, a certain amount of incentives is still 
granted to the CEO, in order to contrast agency costs 
related to altruism and self-control problems typical 
of family ownership (Michiels et al., 2013, Schulze et 
al., 2001).  
On the other hand, when the family pursues 
the maximization of its own utility and indulges in 
the extraction of private benefits, the CEO’s 
compensation contract might be shaped accordingly. 
In cases where the CEO is a member of the family, 
higher CEO compensation might be a direct form of 
extraction of private benefits (Dyck and Zingales, 
2004, Johnson et al., 2000, Morck and Yeung, 2003). 
If the CEO is not a member of the family, he/she 
would find it profitable to collude with the family in 
the extraction of private benefits (Barontini and 
Bozzi, 2011, Burkart et al., 2003, DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2000, Miller et al., 2010), and a more 
generous pay package would be the reward for 
acting in the interest of the family. As a result, the 
CEO’s compensation contract departs from the 
standards of the optimal contracting perspective, 
and is shaped in order to better accommodate the 
CEO’s preferences, i.e. higher total compensation 
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2.4. Investor protection and CEO compensation in 
family firms 
 
Within the scheme described above, the exposure of 
CEO compensation to the influence of the 
institutional context is affected by the ultimate aim 
of the family. 
In fact, if the extraction of private benefits 
from the firm is not the primary aim, the family is in 
the best possible position to negotiate the most 
efficient compensation contract with the CEO, in 
light of either its large-block ownership or owner-
management (Lubatkin et al., 2007). Differently from 
widely held firms, in which the increasing 
monitoring exerted by active investors might 
mitigate the free rider problem engendered by 
atomized shareholders and improve the efficiency of 
contracts (Almazan et al., 2005, Hartzell and Starks, 
2003), in efficiency-maximizing family firms the 
toughest disciplinary power of minority 
shareholders’ scrutiny that comes with a better 
institutional context doesn’t add much to the 
incentives of the family to negotiate an efficient 
contract with the CEO, and no significant 
relationship between the level of investor protection 
and the CEO pay package design is expected.  
We summarize this argument in the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: Under an optimal contracting 
perspective, CEO compensation in family firms is 
insensitive to the level of investor protection. 
On the contrary, if the family that controls the 
firm puts its overall utility as the primary objective, 
the family needs the cooperation of the CEO for the 
extraction of private benefits, and the compensation 
package is set to better accommodate the CEO’s 
preferences, in favor of higher compensation than in 
the case of arm’s length contracting. 
The level of investor protection thus affects 
CEO compensation in two ways.  
First, because in a context with better investor 
protection, the family would be less inclined to 
expropriate minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 
2002), and the need to be “generous” with the CEO 
would be lowered.  
Second, because in contexts with better 
investor protection, the potential costs to the family 
for granting excessive compensation to the CEO 
would be higher. Similar to the outrage reaction of 
shareholders towards the powerful CEO that grants 
himself an overly generous compensation package 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) - both minority 
shareholders and the market as a whole might react 
to excessive CEO compensation by imposing indirect 
costs to the family. Examples of these costs are: the 
legal fees the family must pay when sued by 
minority shareholders; the lower stock price at 
which the stock would trade if higher CEO pay is 
perceived by the market as a signal of the self-
interest of the controlling family (Cohen and 
Lauterbach, 2008); and the loss in the market value 
of the family’s stock following an eventual “against” 
issued by a proxy advisor due to the sub-optimal 
CEO compensation package (Ertimur et al., 2013). 
The probability that the family would incur 
these costs, and the total amount of these costs, is 
strictly related to the quality of shareholders’ 
protection and financial market transparency (La 
Porta et al., 2000, La Porta et al., 2002). It follows 
that, ceteris paribus, in the presence of a better 
institutional context, the family would be less 
inclined to accommodate the CEO’s requests for 
higher pay than in contexts characterized by lower 
investor protection. We summarize these arguments 
in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: Under an opportunism 
perspective, CEO compensation in family firms is 
negatively related to the level of investor protection. 
 
2.5. Family CEO, Professional CEO and investor 
protection 
 
While exploring CEO compensation in family-
controlled firms, a common distinction is made with 
regard to the CEO family status, namely whether the 
CEO is a member of the family (family CEO) or not 
(professional CEO). In fact, family and professional 
CEOs have very different characteristics that 
significantly affect total compensation, as well as the 
amount of incentive-based pay to be provided to the 
CEO. 
A manager with family ties enjoys higher 
employment security than a professional CEO, both 
because of the fulfillment of family obligations 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001) and because the family 
would likely be more complaisant in evaluating 
his/her performance (Schulze et al., 2001). Higher 
job security is therefore counterbalanced by a lower 
level of pay. Moreover, family CEOs have, on average, 
inferior ability than professional management 
(Morck et al., 2000a) and, due to family ties, are 
unlikely to leave the firm for greater pay elsewhere 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). These conditions make it 
unnecessary to pay family CEOs market rates for 
their services, which is not the case with 
professional CEOs.  
A lower level of compensation is then expected 
for the family CEO than for the professional CEO 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). Empirical analyses 
support this hypothesis (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003, 
McConaughy, 2000, Croci et al., 2012), although 
some studies have found contradicting evidence 
(Cohen and Lauterbach, 2008). 
In terms of the CEO compensation structure, a 
characteristic of the family manager is the long-term 
perspective, a natural outgrowth of family 
membership (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). As a 
consequence, granting long-term incentives is 
expected to have limited benefits when the recipient 
is a family CEO (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003), while 
increasing the potentially negative effects related to 
the increased executive power and entrenchment of 
the family manager (Schulze et al., 2001, Pereira and 
Esperança, 2008). It follows that, all other things 
equal, the optimal amount of long-term and stock-
based incentives for a family CEO is lower than for a 
CEO with no familiar connections. Moreover, the 
large amount of the firm’s stock in the portfolio of 
the controlling family implies that the family CEO 
directly bears the effects of his/her actions in terms 
of family wealth (Chrisman et al., 2004). These 
circumstances make the optimal level of equity-
based compensation for a family CEO significantly 
lower than for a professional CEO. 
Following the arguments summarized above 
and previous empirical evidence, we expect that the 
compensation package for a family CEO is 
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characterized by lower total and equity-based 
compensation than for a professional CEO.  
In light of the substantial differences between 
family and professional CEOs, the analysis of the 
relationship between the institutional context and 
CEO pay in family firms must also be refined. 
As highlighted in the previous section, in an 
optimal contracting perspective the CEO’s 
compensation package would be unaffected by the 
institutional context, and the differences between 
family and professional CEO pay packages would 
also be insensible to the level of investor protection. 
However, when the family aims at extracting private 
benefits, the emotional relationship amongst family 
members plays a crucial role with regards to the 
exposure of the CEO pay contract to the influence of 
investor protection. In fact, the collectivist culture 
amongst family members is at the base of bonding 
social relationships among family members, 
especially as they meet the economic and social 
needs of one another, and promote an 
organizational climate in which personal goals are 
subordinate to the goals of the collective (Corbetta 
and Salvato, 2004, James, 1999b). A family CEO 
responds more than a professional CEO to familial 
norms of trust, loyalty and altruism, thus showing a 
greater willingness to adapt his/her own 
compensation package to the family’s needs. As a 
result, in the presence of better investor protection, 
a family CEO is more inclined than a professional 
CEO to curb his/her own compensation, either in 
terms of total or equity-based pay, in order to 
attenuate the indirect costs for the family of 
minority investors’ outrage reaction in the presence 
of “too generous” CEO pay. Likewise, the reciprocity 
in altruism among family members ensures that 
when investor protection is low and there are more 
opportunities to reward the CEO with an extra-rent 
for allowing family’s extraction of private benefits a 
family CEO’s pay increases more than in the case of 
a professional CEO, due to the greater benevolence 
of the family towards its-own members. 
As a result, we expect that the institutional 
context plays a moderating role on the relationship 
between family and professional CEO pay. We 
summarize the arguments above in the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Under an optimal contracting 
perspective, family and professional CEO pay-
packages are insensitive to the level of investor 
protection. 
Hypothesis 2b: Under an opportunism 
perspective, family CEO pay packages are more 
sensible to the level of investor protection than 
professional CEO pay packages. 
 




The sample consists of Continental European non-
financial (SIC 6000-6999) and non-regulated (SIC 
4900-4999) corporations, with 986 firm-year 
observations from 1998 to 2010. We selected 
relatively large companies, with assets worth more 
than €300 million13, from 11 countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland). Family firms made up 40% of our final 
sample. 
Variables used in the empirical analysis are 
described as follows (details provided in Table 1): 
CEO compensation. Different definitions are 
taken into consideration, such as total, cash-based 
and equity-based compensation. Data on CEO pay 
was collected from BoardEx and, when unavailable, 
we gathered data from the financial statements on 
the website of the firms included in the sample.  
Family Ownership. In order to evaluate how 
family control affects CEO pay, we estimated family 
ownership, tracing the identity of the ultimate 
largest shareholder according to the standard 
methodology developed by La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Claessens et al. (2000). As in Faccio and Lang (2002), 
we started by using 10% as the cut off point for the 
existence of a control chain (a listed company with 
no shareholder owning more than 10% is considered 
widely held). However, we imposed two additional 
requirements to assess the influence of “strong” 
family control: a) either the family controls more 
than 51% of direct voting rights, or it controls more 
than twice the voting rights of the second largest 
shareholder; b) according to Astrachan and Shanker 
(2003), at least one member of the firm has to sit on 
the Board of Directors14. Hence, Family Firms is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
characteristics described above are satisfied, and 0 
otherwise.   
For family firms, we assess whether the CEO is 
a family member (Family CEO) or not (Professional 
CEO). 
Investor protection. Cross-country differences 
related to the level of investor protection are 
detected using the Anti-director Rights Index (ADR 
Index) as a proxy for the legal environment and 
governance characteristics15.  
This index, originally proposed by La Porta et 
al. (1998), is a composition of three proxies for 
shareholder voting and three for minority 
protection. With the aim of improving its accuracy, 
Spamann (2010) refined the process for collecting 
and organizing the data, obtaining a more objective 
and reliable version of the index16. This refined 
                                                          
13 Companies included in the sample are selected at the beginning of the 
period (1998) according to the size of the assets. The same list of companies 
is left unaltered over the entire period (1998-2010), except for delisted 
firms, which have been removed from the sample at the year of delisting. 
14 In fact, since the sample is restricted to listed companies, the presence on 
the Board is the better approximation for the “family participation in the 
business” suggested by Astrachan and Shanker (2003). 
15 Over a hundred published papers have used this index in corporate 
governance empirical studies, in very different fields of research (Roe, 2006, 
Pinkowitz et al., 2006, Nenova, 2003, Durnev and Kim, 2005). 
16  As quoted from Spamann (2010), the method at the base of the revised 
version of the ADR Index differs from that of La Porta et al. (1998) in three 
specific, interrelated respects, all of which aim to produce the most reliable 
measurement possible. First, the raw legal data derive directly from primary 
materials analyzed with the help of local lawyers. By contrast, La Porta et al. 
(1998) did not involve lawyers in the data collection process and obtained 
the data mostly from secondary sources such as Price Waterhouse’s Doing 
Business reports for various. Second, Spamann (2010) documents these data 
with references compliant with standards of legal scholarship. In contrast, 
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version of the ADR Index was thus employed in our 
regressions as a proxy for the level of investor 
protection. 
Control Variables. In our analysis, we 
considered a set of variables that previous studies 
had found to be determinants of CEO pay, such as: 
ownership concentration (Firth et al., 2007); firm 
size (Djankov et al., 2008, Rosen, 1982); stock 
market and ROA (Gabaix and Landier, 2008, Abowd 
and Kaplan, 1999, Core et al., 1999); firm risk (Cyert 
et al., 2002, Smith and Watts, 1992); CEO duality 
(Core et al., 1999); the number of years the CEO has 
been appointed and the one-tier or two-tier structure 
of the Board.  
Accounting returns, as well as other accounting 
information, were obtained from Worldscope, while 
market returns were collected from Datastream. 
Table 1 summarizes the list of variables used in 
the empirical analysis. 
 
Table 1. Definition of Variables 
 
Description Variable Type of Variable 







Log of the value of 
Stock and Options 
Grants at the grant 
date 
CEO Total compensation TotalComp 
Log of the sum of 
Base and Equity CEO 
Compensation 
Index of investor 
protection 
ADRI 
Ranges from 1 to 6 
as investor 
protection increases 
A family is the ultimate 
owner of the firm (see 
the definition in the 
text) 
Family firms Dummy (1; 0) 
The firm is widely held 
or is controlled by a 
widely held firm 
Nonfamily firms Dummy (1; 0) 
The CEO belongs to the 
family 
FamilyCEO Dummy (1; 0) 
The CEO of a family 
firm doesn't belong to 
the family 




Stake of cash flow 
rights held by the 
ultimate shareholder 
Firm Size FirmSize Log of Total Assets 
Stock Performance Return 
Annual stock market 
returns 
Accounting Performance ROA Returns on Assets 
Firm Risk StandardDev 
Standard deviation 
of stock returns 
CEO duality Duality Dummy (1; 0) 
Two-tier Board structure Two-tier Dummy (1; 0) 
CEO Tenure Tenure 
Number of years 
since the CEO was 
appointed 
Year Dummies Year t 
Set of Dummies (1; 
0) 
Industry Dummies Industry 
Set of Dummies (1; 
0) 
Country Dummies Country 
Set of Dummies (1; 
0) 
                                                                                        
La Porta et al. (1998) provide no public documentation of the law 
underlying the coding of the original ADRI. Finally, Spamann (2010) 
employed a detailed fifteen-page coding protocol, to ensure consistent 
coding of the raw data into numerical index values, while La Porta et al. 
(1998) provided only the index component definitions, which contain a fair 
number of ambiguities. 
3.2. Methodology 
 
To test the hypotheses described in Section 2, we 
regressed annual CEO compensation on family 
ownership variables and the level of investor 
protection, while controlling for industry and 
company characteristics. We estimated the following 
panel regression with mixed random and fixed 
effects: 
 




where, Comp is total, cash and equity 
compensation respectively for firm i in year t; 
CG Variables are corporate governance 
variables related to the firm i in year t-1 (i.e. 
different family firm dummies and ADR Index); 
ControlVariables are the groups of variables for 
firm i in year t-1 described above. Fixed Effects 
included year and industry dummy variables. For 
industry effects, we used 12 dummy variables based 
on the Campbell (1996) classification; 
Random Effects captured the correlation 
between error terms within each country. 
 
Specific tests on CEO compensation in family 
firms were based on the interaction between family 
ownership characteristics (Family firms, Family or 
Professional CEO) and the level of investor 
protection (ADR Index).  
 
3.3. Sample characteristics 
 
Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of the 
firms included in the sample. 
In terms of CEO pay, the mean (median) total 
CEO compensation for the sample as a whole was 
€2.8 (1.4) million, with a cash-based component 
equal to €1.8 (1.0) million and a lower equity-based 
component (€1.0 million on average). The sub-
sample of family firms shows a slightly higher, 
although not significant, total compensation than 
nonfamily firms, with a higher cash-based 
component and a lower average amount of equity-
based pay. As the analysis will later clarify, this is 
mainly due to nonfamily CEOs (in family firms), 
whose total compensation is, on average, higher 
than that of CEOs in nonfamily firms.  
On average, family firms are smaller than 
nonfamily firms, with a slightly lower risk, as 
measured by standard deviation of stock returns 
computed over the previous 256 days. However, no 
significant differences were detected in terms of 
accounting and market performance (ROA and stock 
returns, respectively). The correlation matrix is 
reported in the Appendix. 
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Family Firms (N=390) Nonfamily Firms (N=596) 
Test Family vs 
NonFamily 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CEO Pay 
BaseComp (€ ,000) 1'796 1'088 2'007 1'088 1'659 1'090 * 
 
EquityComp (€ ,000) 1'040 - 952 - 1'097 - 
 
* 
TotalComp (€ ,000) 2'835 1'366 2'973 1'448 2'745 1'328 
  
Firms' Characteristics 
FirmSize (€ million) 19'094 7'039 14'565 4'641 22'058 8'832 *** *** 
ROA 0.066 0.601 0.063 0.592 0.068 0.606 
  
Return 0.146 0.137 0.139 0.135 0.150 0.137 
  
StandardDev 0.328 0.318 0.319 0.301 0.333 0.324 * * 
Note: Statistical significance: * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 
4. RESULTS 
 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results for 
multivariate analysis along different model 
specifications. In each table, dependent variables are 
CEO total compensation (TotalComp), cash 
compensation (BaseComp) and equity-based 
compensation (EquityComp), respectively. The 
determinants of these variables were analyzed firstly 
through a “basic” regression (columns from (1) to 
(3), and then with the inclusion into the regression 
of interaction terms for the level of investor 
protection (columns from (4) to (6). 
In all regressions we use a set of control 
variables that previous studies have found to be 
significant determinants of CEO pay. As expected, 
ownership concentration has a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with executive 
pay in all specifications. The size of the firm 
(FirmSize) is positively related to the amount paid to 
the CEO, as well as the firm’s accounting 
performance, ROA. Other significant determinants 
are the number of years the CEO has been appointed 
(Tenure) and, to a lesser extent, the two-tier 
structure of the Board (Two-tier). 
 
4.1. CEO pay and Investor protection in Family vs. 
Nonfamily firms 
 
Table 3 assesses the impact of investor protection 
on CEO pay by distinguishing between family and 
nonfamily firms. 
 




TotalComp BaseComp EquityComp TotalComp BaseComp EquityComp 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept (non 
family) 







































ADRI -0.7410 *** -0.6162 ** -0.9212 ** 







       
ADRI*Nonfamily Firms 
     
-0.6959 ** -0.5801 ** -0.7378 
 








Firms       
-0.8311 *** -0.6886 *** -1.3095 *** 


















































































































































Tenure 0.0265 *** 0.0226 *** 0.0431 
 






















































Note: * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 
The intercept of regression is the coefficient for 
nonfamily firms. Within the first specification 
(columns from (1) to (3)), the non-significant 
coefficients on Family firms suggest that CEO 
compensation in family firms is not different from 
that of nonfamily firms. These results differ from 
those obtained by Croci et al. (2012), who find a 
significant lower total CEO compensation for family 
firms, due to a lower level of both cash-based and 
equity-based compensation. The difference is 
probably due to the different period covered (1998-
2010 vs. 2001-2008), the number of countries 
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included (11 vs. 14 countries) and the different 
sample selection17.  
Moving on to evaluating the influence of 
institutional context on CEO compensation, the 
coefficient on ADR Index is always negative and 
highly significant (columns from (1) to (3) in Table 3) 
suggesting that higher investor protection is 
associated with lower cash-based, equity-based and 
total CEO pay. These results are in contrast with the 
optimal contracting hypothesis of a positive 
association between investor protection and both 
total CEO pay (Albuquerque and Miao, 2013) and 
performance-based pay (Zheng et al., 2016, Bryan et 
al., 2010, Bryan et al., 2011, Jouber and Fakhfakh, 
2012); instead, they support the view that in the 
presence of high level of investor protection, the 
corporate board strives to design the best possible 
CEO compensation contracts, due to the threat of 
being held liable for not acting dutifully on behalf of 
their shareholders (Brenner and Schwalbach, 2009). 
Therefore, the evidence that “generous pay” CEO 
contracts are observed in countries with weak 
institutional environments corroborates the 
opportunism perspective. 
In order to assess whether the effect of the 
legal environment on CEO pay differs between 
family and nonfamily firms, we interact the 
dummies for the firm’s ownership with ADR index. 
The coefficients on ADRI*Nonfamily Firms (columns 
from (4) to (6) in Table 3) are all negative, although 
only significant for total and cash-based 
compensation, as evidence of the fact that in 
contexts characterized by lower investor protection 
the increase in total pay is mainly driven by cash-
based compensation. This result suggests that the 
opportunism hypothesis is supported in nonfamily 
firms, as within a more favorable context the CEO 
extracts higher pay. 
With regard to family firms, the opportunism 
hypothesis predicts that investor protection would 
be negatively related to CEO pay. In table 3 (columns 
from (4) to (6)), the coefficients on ADRI*Family 
Firms are all negative and significant. This result 
thus corroborates Hypothesis 1b, insofar as family 
firms grant higher pay to their CEOs in contexts with 
lower investor protection. Results also suggest that 
in order to get higher total compensation, a CEO 
may be willing to accept an even higher amount of 
equity-based compensation – despite the increase in 
sensitivity to the firm’s performance carried by the 
grant of stock and stock options - as a necessary 
stratagem to overcome possible outrage reaction 
from shareholders. As suggested by Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003, pg. 13), over a certain amount, 
additional cash-based compensation easily generates 
an outrage reaction from shareholders, while the 
grant of equity-based pay provides more defensible 
reasons in light of the possible benefits from 
improved incentives, other than being more easily 
camouflaged. Results in Table 3 are consistent with 
this interpretation: in countries with low investor 
protection, CEOs enjoy consistently higher cash-
based pay than in countries with higher investor 
protection, and the concurring higher equity-based 
pay might be conceived as an additional form of rent 
                                                          
17 As explained in Section 3.1, we selected relatively large corporations, 
with assets worth more than €300 million,, while Croci et al. (2012) also 
consider smaller firms. 
extraction, instead of a means aimed at increasing 
pay-performance sensitivity. 
 
4.2. CEO pay and Investor protection within Family 
firms: family CEO vs. professional CEO 
 
We further analyze the impact of investor protection 
on CEO pay in family firms by distinguishing 
between a family CEO and a professional CEO. 
First, we assess whether significant differences 
between family and professional CEO pay exist. In 
Table 4, the intercept of regression is the coefficient 
for nonfamily firms. Within the first specification, 
coefficients on Professional CEO (columns from (1) 
to (3) of Table 4) indicate that professional CEOs of 
family firms receive higher total and cash-based 
compensation than CEOs of nonfamily firms, with 
non-different equity-based compensation. To our 
best knowledge, this is the first empirical 
confirmation to the theoretical prediction developed 
by Chrisman et al. (2013) that professional CEOs in 
family firms request higher total compensation than 
CEOs of nonfamily firms, as a premium for the 
specific risks and costs associated with family firms 
that they must face, such as bounded rationality 
problems associated with family-centered 
noneconomic goals and the family handcuff due to 
the difficulty to transfer to other contexts the 
idiosyncratic knowledge obtained working in family 
firms. 
Coefficients on Family CEO in columns from (1) 
to (3) indicate that non-significant differences in pay 
packages are detected between family CEOs and 
CEOs of nonfamily firms, except for a slightly lower 
level of equity-based pay granted to family CEOs. 
Family CEOs have instead a significantly lower total, 
cash and equity-based compensation than 
professional CEOs (as highlighted by the negative 
and highly significant difference between 
coefficients on Family CEO and Professional CEO at 
the bottom of Table 4), thus confirming the 
structural differences in compensation packages 
between the CEO types in family firms (i.e. Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2003, McConaughy, 2000). 
In light of these differences, we investigate the 
moderating effect of investor protection on CEO pay 
for the different types of CEOs. In Table 4 - 
specifications from (4) to (6) - the three interaction 
terms measure the sensitivity of CEO pay to the ADR 
Index, with regard to the CEO of nonfamily firms, to 
the professional CEO, and to the family CEO in 
family firms, respectively. The coefficients are all 
negative and significant (except for the equity-based 
pay coefficient on nonfamily firms), thus revealing 
that lower CEO pay is associated with higher levels 
of investor protection, whatever the nature of the 
CEO. However, some relevant differences arise with 
regard to the magnitude of coefficients: the 
sensitivity of family CEO total and cash-based pay to 
the institutional context is about twice that of a 
professional CEO, and about three times the ones 
measured on equity-based pay. As reported at the 
bottom of Table 4, these differences are all 
statistically significant. The differences are even 
higher when the sensitivity of family CEO pay to 
investor protection is compared to the CEO of 
nonfamily firms. 
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Table 4. Family nature of the CEO, Investor Protection, and CEO compensation 
 
Dependent variable 
TotalComp BaseComp EquityComp TotalComp BaseComp EquityComp 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept (non 
family) 














Professional CEO 0.2344 ** 0.2023 *** 0.3452 
 

































ADRI -0.7426 *** -0.6177 ** -0.9306 ** 







       
ADRI*Nonfamily firm 
     
-0.6413 ** -0.5380 * -0.5917 
 








     
-0.7799 *** -0.6440 ** -1.0877 ** 








     
-1.4074 *** -1.1563 *** -3.1842 ** 















































































































































Tenure 0.0264 *** 0.0225 *** 0.0430 
 
















CEO vs. Prof. CEO  


























Difference in slope ADRI*Family CEO vs ADRI*WH Firms 
 
-0.7661 ** -0.6184 *** -2.5925 
 







Difference in slope ADRI*Family CEO vs ADRI*Professional CEO -0.6274 ** -0.5123 ** -2.0965 * 































Note: Statistical significance: * = p < .10;  ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 
 
These results then corroborate the 
opportunism perspective presented in Hypothesis 
2b. The higher sensitivity to the level of investor 
protection of the family CEO suggests that when the 
constraints related to the institutional context are 
lessened, the family has a more generous attitude 
towards the CEO if he/she is a family member rather 
than an externally-hired CEO. This interpretation 
finds further support from the circumstance that 
the highest difference in sensitivity to the level of 
investor protection is detected for the equity-based 
pay, a component of the compensation package 
whose incentive power has a lower effectiveness on 
the owner-manager rather than on the professional 
CEO. 
Overall, the results reported above suggests 
that the process of setting a family CEO’s pay is 
affected more by the emotional relationship 
amongst family members than by the aim of 




This study investigates the relationship between the 
level of investor protection and CEO compensation, 
with a particular focus on family firms.  
Using a sample of companies across 11 
Continental European countries, our empirical 
analysis documents that a higher level of investor 
protection is associated with lower total, cash-based 
and equity-based pay in family firms. Similar results 
are found with regard to nonfamily firms, except for 
the non-significant sensitivity of equity-based pay to 
the institutional context. 
This finding stands in contrast with an optimal 
contracting perspective, which suggest that higher 
pay and higher incentives should be granted in 
better institutional contexts. However, different 
explanations of this relationship arise with regard to 
family and nonfamily firms, in light of the different 
agency relationships characterizing these two types 
of ownership. 
In nonfamily firms, the main agency problem is 
the divergence of interests between shareholders 
and managers, and the negative relationship 
between CEO pay and the level of investor protection 
we detect is consistent with the managerial power 
perspective, insofar as in countries with weak 
institutional environments, the lower exposure to 
shareholders’ scrutiny makes it easier for the rent-
seeking CEO to exercise his power towards the board 
and to get a higher level of total compensation, 
mainly in the form of cash-based pay. 
When the company is family-owned, conflicts 
between the CEO and the family are virtually absent, 
due to either the tight control exerted by the family 
on the externally-hired CEO, or the CEO also being 
the owner of the firm. Instead, the main agency 
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problem is related to the conflict of interests with 
minority shareholders that arises when the family 
aims at maximizing its own utility through the 
consumption of the private benefits of control. 
Within this framework, when investor protection is 
weak, the family has higher incentives to extract 
private benefits and faces lower outrage costs 
associated with the more generous pay to the CEO 
for his cooperation. Hence, the negative relationship 
between CEO pay and the level of investor protection 
we detect in family firms is consistent with the 
willingness of the family to recognize higher CEO 
pay in contexts that favor the extraction of private 
benefits for itself, namely when investor protection 
is low. The higher sensitivity to the level of investor 
protection that family CEO pay shows in comparison 
to professional CEO pay suggests that emotional 
relationships amongst family members contribute to 
the shaping of CEO pay contracts. 
Overall, our analysis offers theoretical and 
empirical insights on the relationship between CEO 
pay and the level of investor protection in family 
firms, a topic substantially neglected in the current 
literature. 
This study also has practical implications for 
regulators. By showing that the level of investor 
protection is related to the level of CEO pay, we 
provide relevant information about the effectiveness 
of the institutional context in mitigating CEO pay, a 
theme that over the last decade has captured 
notable attention from the public opinion, calling for 
a regulatory intervention that may curb the 
apparently unstoppable rise in CEO remuneration.  
In response to this request, national regulators 
have intervened through a more stringent regulation 
in terms of disclosure on executive pay, even going 
as far as indicating the composition of fixed and 
variable pay in CEO pay packages, and by providing 
shareholders with the right to vote on the 
compensation policy proposed by the company in 
the general meeting (“Say-on-Pay”). However, the 
efficacy of these measures in curbing the level of 
CEO pay is controversial, as well as the side effects 
they have produced in terms of the distortion of 
incentives for CEOs (see for example: Ferrarini et al., 
2010). Our results highlight that building a more 
“investor friendly” environment, where minority 
shareholders have the opportunity to better monitor 
management and protect their own interests from 
expropriation, is also an effective way to mitigate 
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 ROA  Return  
Standard 
Dev 





0.212 ***                          
Total Comp 0.870 *** 0.567 ***                        
Family -0.028  -0.051  -0.033                       
Family CEO -0.154 *** -0.071 ** -0.148 *** 0.579 ***                    
Non-family 
CEO 
0.112 *** 0.001  0.098 *** 0.637 *** -0.246 ***                  
ADRI -0.308 *** -0.148 *** -0.321 *** -0.175 *** -0.163 *** -0.058 *                
Ownership -0.164 *** -0.124 *** -0.185 *** 0.411 *** 0.361 *** 0.138 *** -0.154 ***              
Firm Size 0.430 *** 0.154 *** 0.433 *** -0.175 *** -0.265 *** 0.043  0.153 *** -0.273 ***            
ROA 0.136 *** 0.156 *** 0.179 *** -0.038  -0.070 ** 0.021  0.065 ** -0.003  0.116 ***          
Return -0.043  -0.018  -0.028  -0.003  0.017  -0.021  0.071 ** 0.024  -0.006  0.109 ***        
Standard 
Dev 
-0.060 * -0.091 *** -0.094 *** -0.082  -0.037  -0.062 * -0.044  -0.060 * -0.171 *** -0.214 *** -0.031       
Duality -0.120 *** 0.088 *** -0.078 ** -0.133 *** -0.005  -0.173 *** 0.273 *** -0.120 *** 0.079 ** 0.067 ** 0.116 *** -0.024     
Two-tier 0.066 ** 0.028  0.033  -0.137 *** -0.102 *** -0.075 ** -0.268 *** 0.007  -0.187 *** -0.114 *** -0.006  0.093 *** -0.090 ***  
Tenure 0.118 *** 0.111 *** 0.136 *** 0.212 *** 0.169 *** 0.084 *** -0.088 *** 0.008  -0.100 *** 0.035  0.005  -0.078 ** 0.077 ** 0.015 
Note: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1% 
 
